As Turkey acts in various ways to serve its own interests, rather than those of the US or the West, it raises its profile and ability to serve as an intermediary in larger relationships between regions and powers that have a history of conflict. Turkey and the US have a history of positive relations, and like all longtime friendships they have hit a rough patch on the road. To move clear of this requires an intentional recognition on the part of both sides that we are living in new times, inside a new global reality.

The Cold War ended years ago, creating the context for what eventually became a new global reality, and new arrangements in power between nations and regions. However, a quick look at much of the rhetoric and hand-wringing on the American side of Turkish-US relations for the past few years obscures this fact. In the wake of certain high-profile international events, many on the American side of the relationship are asking a rather blunt question: Has Turkey gone rogue?

In other words, has Turkey turned its back on the West in such a way that the US can no longer count on Turkey as a consistent ally?

A number of events give rise to this concern. First, the Turkish Parliament denied the US a military base in Turkey from which to conduct the Iraq war. Second, Turkey has a working relationship with Iran and has consistently favored a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Third, Turkey's prime minister walked out of a 2009 session at Davos in protest of Israeli President Shimon Peres' statements about Israel's actions in Gaza. This foreshadowed the provocative “Freedom Flotilla” incident off the coast of Israel in May 2010. Both of these events suggested to many that Turkey was no longer a friend of Israel and had joined forces with Israel's many enemies in the Arab and Muslim world. Finally, Turkey has improved its relationship with Syria after a few decades of strained relations, centered largely on the issue of Kurdish radicals. Since 2007, the two countries have worked on a free trade agreement and their military forces conducted joint drills along their shared border earlier this year.

In addition to these international events, certain domestic issues within Turkey have aroused the concerns of the West. The near repeal of the headscarf ban, in some people's minds, signals a step toward a more observant and possibly radicalized – or at least reinvigorated – Islam. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has Islamist roots and swept into power, and remains in power, with broad popular support. Finally, the vote in favor of a new constitution reduces the power of the military, a key element of the Kemalist secular government established in Turkey in the 1920s, and saw itself as a bulwark against religious radicalism and a defender of secularism and progress from the perceived backwardness and primitivism of the late Ottoman era.

All these combined give the impression of Turkey having turned against the West and the US, after nearly a century of unanimous support and friendship. Some analysts wonder if Turkey is shifting its loyalties toward the East.

‘Interests’ more than ‘loyalties’

Perhaps the language of “loyalties” is outdated – perhaps it is even a relic of Cold War thinking. During the Cold War, there were two opposing superpowers in the world; every other nation chose between them, more or less, and aligned themselves and their national interests with those of their chosen superpower. Diplomatic and economic relations existed within these loyalties, and to transgress them meant going over to “the other side.” The Cold War was a time of relatively simple power relations between the US and the USSR; for most other nations it was a time of general dependence on, entanglement with and loyalty to one of the superpowers.

This era no longer exists, but the thinking behind it still lurks in the minds of many, and it is embedded in the question of whether Turkey is part of the West or of the East. After all, such thinking goes, there are only two choices. Turkey must choose a side and pledge its loyalty accordingly. It can side with the West and swear its continued loyalty to the US (the only superpower left standing after the fall of the USSR), or join the “other side” which includes the nations that make up what former US President George W. Bush famously called the “axis of evil.”

Of course, life and international relations during the Cold War were never exactly so simple; regardless, they certainly are far more complex now at the close of the first decade of the 21st century. President Barack Obama, coming out of the G-20 meeting in Seoul in November 2010, expressed the global reality quite accurately: “You are seeing a situation where a host of other countries are doing well and coming into their own and they are going to be more assertive in terms of their interests and ideas,” he said, speaking at a news conference.

Turkey is one of these nations, along with India, China, Brazil, Chile and several others. These are nations that have strong and growing economies, increasing political stability and expanding power regionally and internationally. As such, they are no longer in relations of dependence on one single superpower, nor do they feel the need to toe the line of uncritical loyalties. In short, they are strong enough to act in terms of their own interests and their own visions for their futures. Turkey is a rising regional superpower, and each of the international events listed above are cases in which Turkey did what was in its best interest instead of blindly following the US or the West because of loyalty or dependence.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's “zero problems” policy explains many of Turkey's actions in recent years. Under this policy, Turkey seeks relationships with “zero problems” with its border neighbors, which include Iran, Syria, Iraq, Armenia, Georgia, Greece, Bulgaria and the island of Cyprus. A US military base on the Turkey/Iraq border was in the interest of the US, but was certainly not in Turkey's, especially in dealing with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)/Kurdish problem. Iranian energy fuels a large portion of Turkey's humming economic engine, so maintaining diplomatic relations with Iran and voting against sanctions clearly falls within Turkey's interests. Syria shares the largest common border with Turkey, so turning a previously hostile militaristic relationship into a cooperative economic partnership bolsters Turkey's security, economy and its political brokering power in the region.

Indeed, as Turkey acts in various ways to serve its own interests, rather than those of the US or the West, it raises its profile and ability to serve as an intermediary in larger relationships between regions and powers that have a history of conflict. This includes the relationship between Syria and Israel, as well as that between the US and Iran.

Dialogue within

Turkey's domestic convulsions, such as the headscarf issue and the constitutional issue, are examples of the powerful, vital conversations happening within Turkey. Such conversations are common, even necessary, in democratic, capitalist nations. Moreover, they occur at various times in a nation's history, often at the beginning of the nation itself, or at the beginning of a new era for the nation. Turkey's issues thematically parallel those that were a source of major concern in the early years of the US as it achieved its independence from Britain through armed revolution. These include serious debates, strong differences, conflicts about the role of religion in public life, the relationship between the institutions of church and state in a secular democracy, the role of the military vis-à-vis the other arms of government and the limits of individual freedoms. While the broad principles of a country on these issues may be consistent over centuries, their proper application varies within distinct situations and contexts. This requires reflection and analysis; with those come debate, disagreement and even rancorous conflict.

Turkey is therefore doing what all vibrant, democratic countries must do in this regard. Unfortunately, to outsiders in the West and elsewhere, Turkey's internal dialogue is often seen in terms of a simple dichotomy of warring tyrannies: religious versus secular. Such a characterization fails to take into account the complexity on both sides – that secularism is right to be worried about religious radicalism of all sorts (especially in a country where over 90 percent belong to a religion which is enduring its own convulsive inner dialogues), and that simply being Islamist does not equal wanting to bring Shariah to Turkey. Simple dichotomies are their own kind of Cold War thinking, one which reduces everything into two simple categories and forces a choice between one or the other; such thinking is not nuanced or complex enough to deal with real situations and the facts on the ground.

Hitting the reset button

Turkey and the US have a history of positive relations, and like all longtime friendships they have hit a rough patch on the road. To move clear of this requires an intentional recognition on the part of both sides that we are living in new times, inside a new global reality. Therefore the old form of the relationship will no longer work; the relationship must be created newly. In the words of the New Testament, one cannot put new wine in old wineskins.

Both sides, however, should be mindful of a few things as they go forward in this new relationship in order to avoid even more treacherous rough patches on the road to the future.

First, the US is arguably the freest country in the history of the world and, as such, it is right and proper for it to stand resolutely for the legal rights of minorities everywhere, especially religious minorities. Turkey should expect to be pushed to deal with its minorities (Alevis, Christians, others) and to continue to perfect its democracy within a majority Muslim state just as the US has spent over 200 years doing the same thing. Turkey has taken positive steps in this regard; however, it must keep moving forward, especially as the trend toward individual religious freedom and public expression materializes. The same principle that affirms women's right to wear headscarves also, by its nature, affirms the freedom and equal opportunity for expression for people of all faiths and no faith, regardless of their majority or minority status.

Secondly, the moral standing of the US has been compromised in recent years – understandably so. Given that, it needs to stop moralizing about Turkey's resistance to using the word “genocide” to classify the Armenian deaths two generations ago. In this case, the US caters to the Armenian diaspora in the US, mostly for political reasons around election time, and ends up actually impeding the normalization of relations between these two communities of people with long historical and cultural ties. Turkey has taken huge steps to create a new era of relations with its Armenian neighbors as part of the zero problems policy and as a matter of simple practicality. The Armenian issue (as well as that with the Cypriots) cannot be allowed to continue as millstones around the neck of the country, dragging it down from the heights it might otherwise scale were it able to settle these issues responsibly, generously and with a long view toward future strength. Turkey knows this and has begun to act, and it will be better served by a US that backs off and lets Turkey handle its own business without much outside commentary on the matter.

Finally, Turkey should be aware of creating a situation in which the US is forced to choose between Turkey and Israel, which in itself is “Cold War thinking” and doesn't take into account the multidimensional nature of the relations on all sides. The US has a complex relationship with Israel that comes from being a principal Allied power that liberated tens of thousands of Jews from the extermination camps in which 6 million of them were murdered in the worst genocide of the modern era. The creation of the modern state of Israel was a response to that genocide and the US feels a responsibility toward the state that runs deep and wide. Most US policy makers are well aware of the problems – and even the hypocrisy and the moral ambiguities – of US/Israel foreign policy and relations. The US must and eventually will work these out on its own timetable and in its own way, not because Turkey holds its feet to the fire. In a choice between Turkey and Israel, Turkey will lose. Given that pockets of perennial racism and sweeping Islamophobia in Europe will most likely prevent Turkey from entering the EU, Turkey needs a Western friend in the US. In this instance Turkey must be a bridge, not burn one.

Indeed, in order to have a role in brokering relations between nations on a larger scale (e.g. between the US and Iran or between Israel and Syria) Turkey must keep a foot in both the East and the West – literally being the “bridge” between them that it historically has been. Turkey's vigorous capitalism, vibrant democracy, and steady progress toward EU markers for membership demonstrate Turkey's solid belonging in the West. Its zero problems relationship with its neighbors, and rising leadership and superiority as a “Muslim” nation keep it rooted also in the East. Maintaining this balancing act and not reverting to simple, dichotomous, Cold War thinking that forces a choice of sides affirms Turkey's own historic nature and models this multi-dimensional reality as a possibility for other nations in the region.

Turkey and the US are doing what most countries must do in the current situation: Creating and adjusting to new realities for themselves and others at the beginning of the 21st century. Turkey in some ways is returning to its historic and traditional role during the Ottoman period, when it was the center not only of a vast empire, but also of an advanced Islamic civilization. It was not then – and is no longer now – the “junior partner” to any country with regard to international matters. The US, of course, does not have Turkey's long and glorious history to “return” to. Despite its short history, however, it was the last superpower standing at the end of the Cold War, and remains a principal force in international relations throughout the world. But, even the US has to adjust to the new reality, the one that President Obama confronted at the G-20 summit. The US and Turkey must not so much go back to a previous time of superpower status, but move forward into a new era of power relations – a flat world of multiregional powers in complex relations that each bolster their distinct economic, security, energy and diplomatic needs.

The world of only one or two superpowers behind which all other countries fall in line after choosing sides no longer exists. That was the old power grid. We now live on a new grid, and both Turkey and the US have to find their place on it – hopefully together – in a way that meets mutual interests and brings greater freedom, democracy and prosperity to the world.